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ABSTRACT
A substantial literature on women’s say in the household focuses on microcredit, but
there is little evidence on the relative roles of credit and education. Using household
survey data from Bangladesh, we provide a comparative analysis of the effects of education
and microcredit on women’s decision making power in the household. We implement two
econometric approaches: bias adjusted OLS estimator of Oster (2019) that extends the
Altonji et al. (2005) approach where selection on observables is used as a guide to selection
on unobservables, and doubly robust radius matching estimator of Lechner et al. (2011).
The evidence suggests a limited impact of microcredit, consistent with the recent evidence
from RCT based studies. In contrast, education is much more important for enhancing
women’s say in a range of household decisions. There is no significant interaction effect
between education and credit. Evidence from Gelbach decomposition suggests that outside
employment is an important mediating mechanism, but household wealth and assortative
marriage matching on education are not important. The impact of education on women’s
decision making remains strong even after controlling for these mediating factors, pointing
to the importance of other mechanisms such as self-confidence and better negotiation skills
of educated women.
Key Words: Women’s Empowerment, Household Decision Making, Women’s Educa-
tion, Microcredit, Bangladesh
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Introduction
Bias against women in the family, labor market, and broader society is common in
many developing countries. Son preference, sex selective abortion, unequal inheritance
laws and customs, restrictions on social and geographic mobility are some of the widely
known examples. Ensuring equality of women has been an important development goal in
recent decades (Sen 1999; Duflo 2012; Kabeer 2005). Women constitute a disproportionate
share of poor and vulnerable people and usually have little say in the household decision
making, especially in patriarchal societies.
There is a widely-held view that educating women is among the most important policy
instruments for achieving gender equality in the household, market, and social interactions
(World Development Report 2012; Sen 1999). There are a number of plausible reasons
to expect that higher schooling would affect the decision making power of women within
the household. Educated women usually earn higher income which reduces their economic
dependence, and makes the threat of divorce (or non-cooperation within the marriage)
more credible when facing conflict of preference with husbands or in-laws. Education also
makes women more confident, articulate, and better prepared to argue for their preferences
and points of view. Amartya Sen writes, “[education] can add to the value of production in
the economy and also to the income of the person who has been educated. But even with
the same level of income, a person may benefit from education in reading, communicating,
arguing, in being able to choose in a more informed way, in being taken more seriously by
others and so on” (Sen 1999, p. 294). A woman with more schooling is less likely to be in
an arranged marriage without her consent, which may result in better matching and more
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balance of power in the household.2 Another important aspect of education compared to
other assets such as land and non-farm business is that it is inalienable, and a husband or
in-laws cannot strip her education when a serious conflict arises (Eswaran 2014).
Although a growing literature has focused on identifying factors that can improve
women’s say in the household, a primary focus has been on the role played by access
to microcredit and working outside home (Eswaran 2014; Hashemi et al. 1996; Kabeer
2001; Anderson and Eswaran 2009). The argument that microcredit may improve women’s
empowerment (or autonomy) is based on the following observations.3 Women, specially
in developing countries, lack access to formal credit markets, which may constrain en-
trepreneurship and economic independence. Microcredit with its focus on women as the
borrowers partly redresses the gender bias in the credit market. Second, standard mi-
crocredit programs such as Grameen and BRAC in Bangladesh also incorporate women’s
empowerment as goals. Third, in group based programs, women can rely on group members
for help and advice when there is conflict with husbands or other family members such as
mothers-in-law.
Empirical evidence on the effects of microcredit membership on women’s decision mak-
ing power within the household is conflicting. Some researchers find that microcredit
enhances women’s earning capability, which in turn contributes to their empowerment
(Hashemi et al. 1996; Kabeer 2001), while others do not find any positive impact (Goetz
2Banerji et al. (2013) and Emran et al. (2014) find that education reduces the probability of arranged
marriage for girls in India and Vietnam, respectively. Koenig et al. (2003) provide evidence that educated
women in Bangladesh are less likely to be victim of domestic violence.
3We use “empowerment” and “autonomy” as interchangeable. However, some authors make a distinction
between them; see, for example, Dixon-Mueller (1998). Our interpretation of “empowerment” is closer to
that of Kabeer (1999) who emphasizes empowerment as the processes by which those who have been denied
the capacity for choice gain this capacity.
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and Gupta 1996; Garikipati 2008; Bajracharya and Amin (2013); Banerjee 2013). Home-
based activities financed by microcredit NGOs may not be effective in improving women’s
position in the household, because they are treated as “invisible income”, similar to much
of women’s unpaid work in home goods production and on the farm. However, working
outside the home facilitated by education may be of special importance for women’s inde-
pendence and better bargaining power in the household (Sen 1999; Anderson and Eswaran
2009; Kabeer 2016).4
This paper has three goals. First, to understand the relative roles of access to credit
and education in improving women’s decision-making power in the household. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first study to provide comparative estimates of the effects
of education and access to microcredit on women’s say in the household in a developing
country, Bangladesh. Second, we test for possible interaction effects between them: are
they complementary, substitutes, or separable?5 One can make a plausible argument in
favor of complementarity between education and credit. The effectiveness of microcredit
may depend on the education of a borrower, because a more educated woman is likely to be
a better manager of a microenterprise and a more efficient investor. Third, we explore the
role of alternative mechanisms including the three most widely discussed in the literature:
working outside the home, household wealth, and assortative matching in marriage in
mediating the impacts. If the estimated impacts remain robust after controlling for these
salient economic mechanisms, it can be interpreted as (indirect) evidence of the importance
of other more intangible mechanisms such as self confidence and negotiation skills of an
4Kabeer (2016) provides a survey and synthesis of the studies on the impacts of paid and unpaid work
on women’s empowerment in Bangladesh.
5Even when they are separable, omitting one factor may cause omitted variables bias in the estimated
effects.
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educated women, as noted by Sen (1999).
We develop an empirical strategy to analyze the effects of access to credit and higher
education with a focus on possible interaction effects and implement it to understand
women’s position in the household in Bangladesh using data from Demographic and Health
Survey (DHS) 2011. It is difficult, if not impossible, to design randomized interventions
or find quasi experimental exogeneous variations that can isolate the effects of credit and
education, with possible interaction effect between them. We take advantage of a rich set
of recent econometric approaches that tackle biases in OLS estimates due to unobserved
ability and preference heterogeneity without imposing exclusion restrictions required in
an instrumental variables approach. We use the doubly robust radius matching estimator
developed by Lechner et al. (2011) that makes the treatment and comparison groups
more comparable using both propensity score matching and regression adjustments. The
evidence on balance between the treatment and comparison shows that matching plus
regression adjustments eliminate much of the imbalance observed in the simple means. This
approach also allows us to test for possible complementarity between access to credit and
higher education without imposing any functional form. More importantly, we implement
the bias-adjusted OLS estimator developed by Oster (2019) that extends the approach
originally due to Altonji et al. (2005). Following Altonji et al. (2005), Oster (2019) uses
selection on observables as a guide to selection on unobservables, and provides a method
to estimate consistently the omitted variables bias, which, in turn, yields a bias-adjusted
estimate net of selection on unobservables.6
6The existing evidence on the impact of microcredit on women’s empowerment in Bangladesh primarily
relies on the OLS estimator, and thus, the estimates are likely to be substantially biased because of selection
on unobservables.
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The estimates from alternative econometric approaches deliver a set of robust conclu-
sions. The evidence suggests a limited impact of access to microcredit on Bangladeshi
women’s decision making power in the household.7 This finding is consistent with the ev-
idence from RCT based studies of microcredit in other developing countries.8 The effects
of higher education, in contrast, are positive and significant (at the 5 percent or less levels)
for all types of decisions considered: from monetary decisions such as large purchases to the
more knowledge-intensive decisions such as children’s health care. The effects of education
are substantial in magnitude: a woman with primary or more schooling is 8%-11% more
likely to have a say in these household decisions compared to a woman without primary
schooling. There is no evidence of complementarity between education and credit.
We explore the mechanisms behind the strong impacts of education. The evidence
from Gelbach (2016) decomposition suggests that working outside home is an important
mediating mechanism for all the decisions considered. Household wealth plays a mediating
role only in children’s health care decisions, and marriage matching is not significant as a
mechanism for any of the decisions. Perhaps, more importantly, the effects of education
on the decision making of women remain both numerically substantial and statistically
significant (at the 5 percent level) when we include husband’s characteristics (as proxies
for assortative matching), an indicator of household’s wealth status, and a dummy variable
indicating whether a woman works outside the home. This can be interpreted as evidence
7The evidence suggests that microcredit does not have a significant impact in three out of four decisions
we analyze.
8See the discussion by Banerjee (2013). The fact that the evidence on the effects of microcredit from
our research design reaches conclusions similar to the RCT based studies is reassuring, and suggests that
our approach deals adequately with the biases in the OLS estimates. The OLS estimates suggest positive
and significant effects of credit consistent with upward bias because of omitted ability and preference
heterogeneity.
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that education enhances women’s decision making power through other channels such as
self-confidence, better negotiation skills improving her bargaining power, and comparative
advantage in knowledge-intensive decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of the
conceptual issues related to the effects of education and access to credit on women’s place
in the household. The next section lays out the empirical strategy for estimating the effects
of higher education and access to credit on women’s decision making power. Section (4)
discusses the data and the variables. The main empirical results on the effects of credit
versus education are reported in section (5). Section (6) provides a formal test of the
null hypothesis that education and credit are separable in determining women’s say in the
household. We explore the mechanisms in section (7) including the evidence from Gelbach
(2016) decomposition. The paper concludes with a summary of the main findings.
2. Conceptual Issues
The literature on women’s decision making in the household uses survey questions on
decisions regarding own and children’s health, geographic mobility, and household purchases
(daily needs and large purchases), among other things. It may be useful to consider two
channels through which education and credit may affect the decision making role of women
in the household. First, it may affect the bargaining power (threat utility) of women, and
second, it may affect comparative advantage in making a decision.
The focus of the recent literature has been on the women’s threat utility in a bargaining
model (Agarwal 1997, Eswaran 2014). The quality of decision making remains a neglected
aspect, not considered in many recent papers on women’s autonomy in household decision
making. It is important to appreciate the role of comparative advantage in this context
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as some decisions may be categorized as relatively “knowledge intensive”. For example,
decisions regarding health are likely to be more “knowledge intensive” in the sense that
a more educated person will be able to make a better decision. This implies that a more
educated woman may have greater say in these cases even in the absence of any change
in her income and bargaining power. In contrast, spending decisions about large (durable
goods) purchases may primarily depend on who earns the money and the bargaining power
that comes with economic independence. Thus, access to credit is more likely to affect
spending decisions when credit financed activities lead to higher income for the borrower
women. Another widely used indicator of a woman’s bargaining power relates to whether
she needs permission for geographic mobility and social interactions.9 In the DHS 2011
data set, women were asked whether they needed permission for visiting her own family
and friends. Decisions regarding mobility are not complex and there is no obvious reasons
to expect that a better educated woman would have any comparative advantage in taking
such decisions. However, they might be particularly good indicators of a woman’s position
in the household as she is likely to place a premium on visiting her natal family and conflict
of preference between husband and wife may be sharp in this case.10
There are two important distinctions between access to credit and education when the
focus is on the threat utility of women (compared to her husband or partner). First,
education is inalienable, but a business built with microcredit can be expropriated when
there is a conflict (or in the event of divorce). Expropriation of property rights to land
9Bloom et al. (2001) find that the women with freedom of geographic mobility in India obtained higher
levels of antenatal care and were more likely to get safe delivery care.
10In an analysis of women’s decision making in the households in Sri Lanka, Malhotra and Mather (1997)
find that education and employment affect women’s say in financial decisions, but have little impacts on
the decisions relating to social interactions.
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and other assets of women is unfortunately common in a developing country with weak
property rights enforcement such as Bangladesh. This implies that the effects of education
may be more important than the direct effect of income and assets on the bargaining power
of a woman. Second, education is a salient factor in marriage market matching, and more
educated women are likely to be married to more educated men. In so far as a more
educated husband is more likely to treat his wife better, educated women will benefit from
assortative matching on education in the marriage market. Thus, the effects of education
include the assortative marriage channel.
3. Empirical Strategy
The literature on the effects of microcredit on women’s decision making (empowerment)
in the household uses a variant of the following empirical model:
D
j
i = α0 + α1Mi +X
′
iΓ + εi, (1)
where Dji is a dummy variable taking on the value of 1 when woman i exercises her pref-
erence in decision j , Mi is a dummy variable indicating whether she is a microcredit
borrower, and Xi is a vector of individual, family, and village characteristics that can affect
both the selection into microcredit and women’s bargaining power in the household.
When the focus is on estimating the effects of education on women’s decision making
in the household, one can estimate a similar empirical model:
D
j
i = β0 + β1Ei +X
′
iΦ + ϵi, (2)
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where Ei is an indicator of the education level of woman i.
Although it is widely argued that both education and access to credit may enhance
women’s standing in the household and beyond, most of the existing discussions implicitly
assume that there is no interaction effect between them. A more general specification suited
for understanding the effects of education and access to credit on women’s decision making
power within the household can be written as:
D
j
i = θ0 + θ1Mi + θ2Ei + θ3 (Mi ∗ Ei) +X
′
iΠ+ ξi. (3)
If education and access to credit are complementary (substitutes) in strengthening women’s
say in the household, then we expect θ3 > 0(< 0) . Estimating Equation 3, however, poses
challenges because of unobserved heterogeneity in ability and preference. The existing
literature tries to take advantage of randomized credit interventions or credible policy
experiments (such as changes in compulsory schooling) to identify the effects of credit and
education separately. However, finding policy experiments or designing an intervention
that can create clean exogenous variations powerful enough to identify the effects of both
education and access to credit is a daunting task, and may not be feasible in most cases.11
As noted by Ravallion (2009) and Elbers and Gunning (2014), estimating the effects of
unidimensional interventions (either credit, or schooling) may be misleading in ranking
alternatives if there are significant interaction effects.
In the empirical analysis, we use a binary indicator of education and split the sample in
11Card (1999) notes that randomized interventions face especial challenges in education, because it is
impossible to design an intervention that increases schooling of a random student by one year. Also, credit
intervention would need to wait many years after the intervention in school which makes such a research
project extremely difficult. We are not aware of any randomized interventions designed in this way.
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four different groups defined by the pair of binary indicators (Mi, Ei) ; they are (0, 0), (0, 1),
(1, 0), (1, 1). For example, the group (0, 1) comprises of women who are not microcredit
borrowers (Mi = 0) and have higher education (Ei = 1). With these mutually exclusive
four groups, we can rewrite equation (3) as follows:






where the group (0.0) is the comparison group comprising of women who are low educated
and not microcredit members (as it is in equation (3) above), and there are three target
group dummies defined for the other three groups. In this framework, complementarity
implies δ3 > δ1+ δ2, substitutability δ3 < δ1+ δ2, and separability δ3 = δ1+ δ2. Perhaps the
most important advantage of this approach is that we can implement the doubly robust
matching estimators developed in the evaluation literature for a binary treatment.12 As a
robustness check, we provide estimates using years of schooling as an indicator of education.
We use a recently developed doubly robust matching estimator that helps reduce the
biases in estimates with non-experimental data. In particular, we implement the distance
weighted bias corrected radius matching (henceforth BC-RM) due to Lechner et al. (2011).
The BC-RM combines the following: (i) weighting of the matched controls within the radius
according to their distance to the treated observation, (ii) bias adjustment based on OLS
or logit regression depending on the support of the outcome variable (doubly robust), (iii)
partially data-driven choice of the radius size as a function of the distances in pair matching
12One might argue that we are “throwing away” information by dichotomizing the schooling variable. It
is important to appreciate that a continuous treatment places a much higher demand on the data. In the
context of evaluating microcredit programs, Morduch and Roodman (2014) provide an excellent discussion
on this point, and argue for using a binary indicator of MFI membership instead of the amount of loans
as the treatment variable.
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and (iv) asymptotically unbiased propensity score trimming to ensure common support in
the propensity score across treatment groups.
An advantage of the doubly robust matching estimator in our application is that we
can test for the existence of an interaction effect without imposing an arbitrary functional
form. To appreciate this, consider a more general specification of the empirical model that
allows for both education and credit effects:
D
j
i = F (Mi, Ei, Xi) . (5)














> 0 if complementary
< 0 if substitutes
(6)
We can estimate a discrete analog of the cross-partial derivative in inequality (6) above
using matching estimators that do not impose any functional form.
The BC-RM estimator relies on the maintained assumption that conditional on the
observables included in the model, there are no significant unobservable factors that affect
both the selection into the treatment and the outcomes. We relax this assumption by
implementing the bias-adjusted estimator due to Oster (2019) that builds on the earlier
influential work of Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) (henceforth AET 2005). The AET
(2005) method uses selection on observables as a guide to selection on unobservables, and
provides conditions under which a lower bound on the causal effect can be estimated without
imposing any exclusion restrictions. The lower bound in AET (2005) is derived under two
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assumptions: (i) selection on unobservables is equal to selection on observables and (ii)
the R2 of a hypothetical regression that includes all the relevant variables (observables
and unobservables) equals 1, which excludes the possibility of measurement error in the
outcome variables or idiosyncratic shocks. A limitation of the AET (2005) approach is
that, in a linear OLS regression, it is not possible to calculate a bias adjusted treatment
effect. Oster (2019) relaxes the second assumption and, more importantly, provides a way
to calculate the bias-adjusted treatment effect for the OLS estimator.
Consider the following modified model, corresponding to equation (4) above:










iΦ + ζi, (7)
where Xi denotes the vector of observables, and Zi is the vector of unobservables, ζi is
the error term capturing measurement error and idiosyncratic shocks, and, as before, the
vector of treatment dummies are denoted by Di. The relationship between selection on

























As discussed by AET (2005) and Oster (2019), it is plausible to take µ = 1 as the upper-
bound in most of the cases because the surveys are designed to collect data on the salient
determinants of household and individual behavior, and as a result, the observables are

























our context, for example, the survey collected data on the land ownership of the household,
which is used as a selection criterion by most of the microcredit programs in Bangladesh.
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Since land ownership is an important indicator of household wealth, it will capture scarcity
in a household which can sharpen the conflicts in decision making. The survey also has
information on the availability of primary and secondary schools in a community which are
important factors in schooling decisions of girls in Bangladesh.
AET (2005) assumes that the value of R2 in the hypothetical regression (7) , denoted
as R2max, is equal to 1, i.e., R
2
max = 1, which does not allow any role for measurement error
or idiosyncratic shocks. Oster (2019) extends the approach by assuming that R2max < 1.
In Oster’s analysis, the value of R2max is bounded by the estimated R
2 from the data,
denoted as R̃2, from the model in equation (4) above. Based on an analysis of a set of
published articles using randomized experiments, she suggests a value of R2max = 1.3R̃
2
that validates the estimated treatment effects in 90% of the experiments. Oster (2019)
develops a consistent estimator of the omitted variables bias and a bias-adjusted OLS
estimator under the conditions that µ = 1 and R2max = 1.3R̃
2. This allows us to provide a
bias-adjusted OLS estimate that corrects for selection on unobservables. As a conservative
strategy, we will also check the robustness of the conclusions allowing for a larger role for
selection on unobservables, considering higher values of µ, up to µ = 2.
4. Data and Variables
The data used for the empirical analysis come from the nationally representative Bangladesh
Demographic and Health Survey (BDHS) 2011. The enumeration areas (EAs) of the 2011
population census provided by Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) constitute the sam-
ple frame for the survey. The 2011 BDHS is a two-stage stratified sample of households. In
the first stage, 600 EAs were selected with probability proportional to the EA size, with 207
in urban areas and 393 in rural areas. In the second stage, a systematic sample of about
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30 households was selected from each EA. The survey covers a total of 17,141 households
from which 17,842 ever-married women aged 13 to 49 were interviewed.
The survey is conducted using four main questionnaires: household, women’s, men’s,
and community questionnaires. The data used in this paper come from the household,
women’s and community questionnaires. The household questionnaire is designed to collect
information on individual characteristics such as his/her age, sex, education, and relation-
ship to the head of the household, and household characteristics such as source of water,
type of toilet facilities, materials used to construct the house, and ownership of various
consumer goods etc. The women’s questionnaire collects information on the respondent’s
participation in household decision-making, her age, education, religion, reproductive his-
tory, use of contraceptive methods, antenatal and delivery care, membership in income
generating NGOs, and husband’s background. The community questionnaire collects in-
formation such as the existence of development organizations, availability, and accessibility
of health care and family planning services, main economic activities, and access to roads
and electricity.
Our analysis focuses on rural households. Some of the interviewed women are not
members of the respective households, and we drop those observations as the household
and community characteristics may not be relevant to them. We also drop those women
who are not currently married; where the husband’s age is missing or where the husband
is 25 or more years older than the wife; where the wife is older than the husband; where
the respondent’s relation to the household head is something other than head herself, wife,
daughter or daughter-in-law; or where the household head’s age is less than 20 years. That
leaves us with a final sample of 9,373 observations. Sample sizes are not the same in all
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the estimated equations owing to missing values of the outcome variables.
Our focus is on women’s participation in household decision making. In the survey,
women are asked “who has the final say” on “respondent visiting her family and rela-
tives,”“respondent’s own health care,”“child health care,”and “large household purchase”.13
Responses are “respondent alone,” “respondent jointly with husband or others” and “hus-
band or someone else”. We construct an indicator variable for each of the decisions that
takes on 1 if the respondent woman takes the relevant decision alone or jointly with husband
and/or others, and 0 otherwise.
The main regressors of interest are two binary variables - access to credit (M) and ed-
ucation (E). Access to credit takes on 1 if the respondent is a member of any microfinance
institution (MFI) such as Grameen Bank, BRAC, ASA, PROSHIKA or other income gen-
erating NGOs, and 0 otherwise. Primary schooling is used as the cut-off for education; the
education dummy takes on 1 if the respondent has 6 or more years of schooling and 0 oth-
erwise.14 In all of the regressions, we include a set of individual, household and community
characteristics to take into account selection on observables. We include the age of the
respondent and age-squared. The effect of age is not unambiguous from a priori consider-
ations. An older woman has more experience as well as a better understanding of her role
in the family that can positively affect her participation in decision-making. On the other
hand, an older woman may value the traditional role of women, leaving the decision-making
13The survey also asked the women about contraceptive choice. We do not include it in the analysis for
two reasons. First, 93 percent of women in our data have say in making contraceptive choices suggesting
there is little gender bias in this instance. Second, the sample for analysis becomes much smaller when we
include contraceptive use as an indicator.
14As part of robustness checks, we also provide the Oster (2019) bias corrected OLS estimates from a
specification where education is measured by years of schooling instead of a dummy variable indicating
more than primary schooling.
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matters in the hands of the male members of the family. Also, younger women exposed
to changing social norms (for example, through social media) may have a defiant attitude
towards the traditional role of women in the society compared to the older women. Reli-
gion can play an important role which is captured by a dummy variable for a respondent
being Muslim. Access to schools can affect a girl’s education significantly, especially in a
context where women’s geographic mobility is restricted either because of social norms or
worry about harassment on the road. We include dummies indicating whether there are
primary and secondary schools in a community. The regressions also include indicators of
access to markets (distance to the nearest city corporation) that can be important for both
education (better returns to education), and cost-benefit of taking microcredit because a
well-functioning labor market reduces the demand for microcredit (Emran et al. (2021)).
Summary statistics on the outcome variables in the online appendix Table A.4 show
that women’s participation rate is 67% in child health care decision, 62% in own health care
decision, 61% in deciding when to visit family and relatives, and 58% in large household
purchases. When the four indicators are combined, 41% of the women participate in all 4
decisions, 57% in at least 3, 69% in at least 2, and 81% in at least 1 decision. About 43%
of women have access to credit, 35% have 6 or more years of schooling and only 13% have
both access to credit and 6 or more years of education. The respondents in the survey are
women aged between 15 to 49 years and the average age is 31 years. The share of Muslim
women in the sample is 90%, most households have less than 0.5 acres of land (83%) and the
average number of adult (10 years or older) household members is 4.05. Of the community
characteristics, 63% respondents belong to communities with all weather access road, 78%
with access to electricity, 82% with primary schools, 36% with high schools, 25% with
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post offices and 30% reside within 40 kilometers from the nearest city corporations. The
distribution of the sample by treatment status is presented in the online appendix Table
A.1, and the mean participation rates in household decisions by treatment status are in
the online appendix Table A.2.
5. Empirical Results
We discuss the estimates in two steps. We start with the estimates that rely on con-
ditional independence assumption (CIA); in particular we report estimates from OLS, and
the bias corrected radius matching (BC-RM) due to Lechner et al. (2011). We then address
potential biases resulting from unobserved heterogeneity in preferences and abilities using
Oster (2019) bias adjusted OLS (BA-OLS) estimator.
5.1 Estimates Based on the Conditional Independence Assumption
Table 1 reports the estimates of parameters δ1, δ2 and δ3 in equation (4) above using
the OLS, and BC-RM estimators. The OLS estimates, reported in the odd numbered
columns, suggest that access to credit among women with low education has a positive
impact on women’s participation in three out of four decisions: visiting family and relatives,
child health care, and large household purchase, but the effect is not significant at the 10
percent level for own health care. The effects of education among women with no access to
microcredit are numerically larger and statistically significant at the 1 percent level for all
four decisions. The OLS estimates also do not show any evidence of an interaction effect
between access to credit and education in so far as women’s say in the household decisions
is concerned; none of the estimates of parameter δ3 is statistically significantly different
from the additively separable effects (δ1 + δ2) at the 10 percent level. The OLS estimates
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are, however, likely to be substantially biased.
Evidence from the Bias Corrected Radius Matching Estimator
If the biases in the OLS estimates are at least partly eliminated by matching, we
would expect better covariate balance between the “treatment” and “comparison” after
matching when compared to the raw data. To check covariate balance with and without







× 100, where XT and S
2
T are the mean and variance of covariate X
for treatment group, and XC and S
2
C are the mean and variance of X for the comparison
group, respectively. The standardized percentage biases of all covariates for three treat-
ment groups (credit, education, and both credit and education) are shown in Figure 1,
with and without matching. Detailed estimates are presented in Table A.3 in the online
appendix. The evidence shows that matching substantially improves covariate balance.
All the post-matching bias estimates shown in Figure 1 are within the range of 10%.15
Additional evidence from a comparison of the raw sample and the matched sample shows
much lower values of pseudo R2 after matching, thus strengthening the evidence from the
standardized bias estimates.
The BC-RM estimator relies on a common support assumption which requires that
each individual has a positive probability of receiving treatment. Figure AF.1 in the online
appendix presents the propensity score distributions for the treatment and control groups.
The propensity score distribution suggests that the common support assumption is satisfied
for all three types of treatments: access to credit (Mi = 1), higher education (Ei = 1), and
15The standardized bias of 10% is considered to indicate the negligible imbalance in covariates (Normand
et al., 2001).
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both access to credit and higher education (Mi = 1, Ei = 1).
The BC-RM estimates are smaller in magnitude compared with the corresponding OLS
estimates (see the BC-RM estimates reported in the even numbered columns in Table 1).
This is consistent with the widely held view that OLS estimates of the effects of credit
and education are likely to be biased upward. In contrast to the OLS estimates, the BC-
RM estimates suggest no significant effect of access to credit on the decisions regarding
large purchases or visiting friends and family.16 The effects of education, however, remain
significant at the 5 percent or lower levels for all four decisions according to the BC-RM
estimates.
The lower panel of Table 1 reports the effects of credit and education on four differ-
ent indicators of women’s decision making by counting the number of decisions a woman
participates in. The evidence shows that the effects of education again dominate that of
credit, consistent with the evidence in the top panel. For example, according to the BC-RM
estimates, access to credit does not have any significant effect on the probability that a
woman participates in all 4 decisions, but higher education (more than primary schooling)
has a statistically significant and numerically substantial effect: a 4.6 percentage points
increase in the probability of participation.
The joint treatment of education plus credit, however, does not suggest a stronger effect
when compared to the effect of education alone, indicating that there is no complementarity
between education and access to credit. We present formal tests of the null hypothesis of
separability between education and credit in a later section.
16This is consistent with the evidence presented by Bajracharya and Amin (2013) that the OLS estimates
of the impact of microcredit on domestic violence in Bangladesh are driven by selection biases. They find
that the estimates based on propensity score matching do not show any significant differences between
households with and without microcredit.
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5.2 Addressing Selection on Unobservables: Estimates from Oster (2019)
Bias Adjusted OLS (BA-OLS) Estimator
In this section, we discuss estimates from the Oster BA-OLS estimator which relaxes
the CIA assumption and addresses selection on unobservables. The estimates are reported
in Table 2.
The evidence in Table 2 shows that education has numerically substantial and statis-
tically significant (at the 1 percent level) positive effects across the board. In contrast,
access to credit has a positive and significant (at the 5 percent level) effect on only two
decisions (large household purchases and children’s health care), but no perceptible effect
on the other two decisions. The evidence from BA-OLS is different in the case of large
purchases compared to the estimate from BC-RM estimator in Table 1 that suggests no
significant impact. Given this conflict, the evidence on large purchases is not conclusive
and open to different interpretations. We favor a conservative approach and consider the
evidence of an impact robust enough only when both BC-RM and BA-OLS estimates lead
to the same conclusion.
The positive effect of credit on children’s health care reinforces the widely-discussed find-
ing in the literature that women’s economic independence leads to reallocation of household
budget in favor of health and education of children. However, the recent evidence shows
that the positive income effect of microcredit is more likely for only a subset of borrowers
who are entrepreneurial (Banerjee et al. (2015)), implying that the magnitude of the im-
pact of credit on women’s decision making power is likely to be modest. A comparison of
the estimates for credit vs. education supports this interpretation, as the numerical mag-
nitude of the education effect is much larger across the board in Table 2. The differences
21
between the effects of education and credit are statistically significant at the 5 percent
level for all of the decisions. Even for the monetary decisions such as large purchases, the
impact of credit is much smaller: a woman with microcredit membership is 3.4% more
likely to have a say in decisions regarding large purchases, while a woman with primary
schooling is 8.7% more likely to have a say. The evidence is consistent with the idea that
the effect of education is likely to be stronger because it captures three mechanisms: (i)
the knowledge effect (comparative advantage), (ii) the independent income effect as higher
education (more than primary schooling) opens up opportunities in the labor market, and
(iii) the more intangible channels such as self-confidence and negotiation skills.
The estimated effects of joint treatment of higher education plus microcredit from the
Oster (2019) bias adjusted OLS estimator are reported in the last column of Table 2. The
effects of the joint treatment are numerically larger than the corresponding estimates for
education in three decisions: large purchases, children’s health care, and visiting family
and friends, but the differences between education and joint treatment are not statistically
significant at the 10 percent level.
The results on the combined indicators of woman’s decision making power in the house-
hold using the Oster estimator are reported in the lower panel of Table 2. The evidence
again supports the primacy of education; for example, while access to microcredit has no
effect on the probability of participation in all 4 decisions, a woman with more than primary
schooling enjoys a 8.3 percentage points higher probability of such extensive participation
in household decision making.
The estimates in Table 2 assume µ = 1, following the suggestions of Oster (2019) and
Altonji et al. (2005). As a conservative strategy, we check the robustness of the conclusions
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allowing for a larger selection on unobservables. The estimates for µ = 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2.0
are reported in the online appendix Tables A.5 (for credit) and A.6 (for education). All
the conclusions based on Table 2 remain valid.
(6) The Interaction Effect: Test of Separability
As discussed in section (2), education may be complementary to access to credit in
increasing women’s participation in household decision-making. Comparative advantage
derived from increased knowledge may complement access to credit in increasing women’s
participation in household decision-making. On the other hand, increased earning potential
of a higher educated woman in the labor market may act as a substitute for access to credit.
To test the nature of interaction between access to credit and education, we estimate
∂
∂Mi
F (· ), the marginal effect of access to credit, for more educated (Ei = 1) and less edu-
cated (Ei = 0) sub-samples separately and take the difference between these two to estimate
the discrete analog of ∂
2
∂Mi∂Ei
F (· ) . We test of the null hypothesis that the difference is
zero, implying that education and credit are separable. The results for the BC-RM and
Oster BA-OLS estimators are reported in Table 3.17 The evidence is very robust that the
null hypothesis of separability cannot be rejected for any of the four decisions, and this
conclusion is valid across different estimators in Table 3.
The evidence discussed so far relies on a binary classification of educational attainment.
To check if the main conclusions are robust when we use years of schooling instead, we
report the estimates using Oster (2019) estimator in Table 4. The estimates show that all
the conclusions based on the binary educational attainment earlier remain intact.
17We omit the simple OLS estimates for the sake of brevity. They are available from the authors.
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(7) Mechanisms (Pathways)
Three mechanisms have been widely discussed in the recent economic literature: mar-
riage market matching based on education, work outside the home, and wealth effect.
However, as emphasized by Amartya Sen in many of his writings (see, for example, Sen
(1999)), the effects of education on other relatively intangible aspects of quality of life may
be equally valuable. Education reduces a “fundamental insecurity”, especially for women
(Sen (1999)), and make them more confident and articulate. More educated women are
more likely to know their rights and successfully resist usurpation of their rights. In this
section, we explore two questions: (i) the relative roles of the three mechanisms, and (ii)
whether there is any significant role left for the intangible mechanisms emphasized by Sen
once we control for the three mechanisms noted above.
As a first step, we provide evidence on the link between women’s education and the three
channels described above. Table 5 reports estimates of the effects of women’s education on
indicators of matching in marriage (husband’s education, age gap with husband, conflict of
preference)18, a dummy for working outside home, and an indicator of household wealth.19
The OLS estimates, with and without controls, suggest that a higher educated woman is, in
general, matched with a more educated husband, and higher education of women increases
the probability of working outside home and household wealth (all three are significant
at the 1 percent level), reduces the age gap and conflict of fertility preference between
18Husband’s education is a dummy variable equalling 1 if the husband has 6 or more years of schooling
and zero otherwise. The age gap equals the husband’s age minus the wife’s age. The indicator of conflict
of preference is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if a husband wants more children than his
wife.
19Household wealth is represented by a wealth index reported in the DHS 2011 data. The index is
constructed using household asset data via principal components analysis (NIPORT et al. 2013).
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husband and wife.20 The Oster BA-OLS estimates do not find any significant effect of
higher education of a woman on the age gap and conflict of preference, suggesting that the
impacts found earlier in the OLS estimates are driven by selection on unobservables. In
contrast, the impacts of higher education of a woman on household wealth and probability
of working outside home remain robust in the BA-OLS estimates. With this evidence, we
now turn to the question whether the effects of education on women’s say in household
decisions found earlier are in fact mediated through these channels, with a focus on the
roles of working outside and household wealth.
Matching in the marriage market based on education can lead to a better balance of
power between the husband and wife. We test this hypothesis by including a dummy for
husband having more than primary schooling, age gap between wife and husband and its
squared, and an indicator of conflict of preference. The results using BC-RM and Oster
BA-OLS estimators are reported in the first two columns of Table 6. The evidence is
striking: the estimated effects of education on women’s ability to participate in decision
making remains largely unaffected (compare with the estimates in Table 1 and 2), and in
some cases, the magnitude of the effect is larger once we control for these variables.
Higher education may facilitate work outside the home through employment in the
formal sector such as the garment industry in Bangladesh or in the government supported
primary and secondary schools as teachers. This is consistent with the evidence in Table
5. To see if this channel is primarily responsible for the strong effects of education on
women’s say found earlier, we control for a dummy indicating that a woman was employed
outside the home during the last 12 months of the survey date. The results, reported in
20The effect is not significant for conflict of preference when we control for credit access.
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columns 3 and 4 of Table 6, show that the estimated effects of education do not change in
any substantial way, especially for the Oster (2019) estimator (compare to the estimates in
column 2 of Table 2).
Columns 5 and 6 in Table 6 report the estimates when we control for a measure of
household wealth based on the principal component analysis of a household’s assets (see
the discussion in the data section).21 If the competition for limited income sharpens the
gender conflicts, we would expect that the more educated households to have fewer such
conflicts, because higher educated women live in households with higher wealth in our
context, as found in Table 5. The estimates show that the impact of education on decision
on children’s health care is lower once we control for wealth: the Oster bias adjusted OLS
estimate goes down from 0.078 in Table 2 to 0.66 in Table 6. However, the wealth channel
is not important for the other three decisions as the bias adjusted OLS estimates of the
effects of education are larger or unchanged (compared to Table 2).
The last two columns in Table 6 provide the estimates when the indicators capturing
all three mechanisms are added as controls in the regression. The point estimates of the
effects of education are larger in magnitude (compared to Table 2) for decisions about
large household purchase and visiting friends and family, but slightly smaller for the health
related decisions.
Finally, we implement Gelbach (2016) decompositions that use the omitted variables
bias formula in an OLS regression to decompose the combined effects of the three mecha-
nisms above. As noted by Gelbach (2016), the standard practice of sequential addition of
different variables to check how the estimate of interest (the effect of education) changes
21This measure of household wealth is reported in the DHS 2011 survey.
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can be misleading because the conclusion depends on the order of addition. The results
from Gelbach (2016) decompositions are reported in Table 7, and the evidence shows that
working outside the home is a statistically significant mechanism in all decisions and house-
hold wealth only for children’s health care. This is consistent with existing evidence on
the importance of working outside the home for women in Bangladesh to gain autonomy
(Eswaran (2014)).
Perhaps, the most important take away from the evidence in Tables 6 and 7 is that the
effects of education on women’s say in the household do not seem to be driven primarily
by the three salient economic channels discussed in the literature. This can be interpreted
as suggestive evidence that education improves women’s say in the household primarily
through more intangible channels such as a sense of security, self-confidence, self-respect,
and better negotiation skills as emphasized by Amartya Sen (1999).
(8) Conclusions
We provide an analysis of the relative importance of access to credit and education
as instruments for improving women’s decision making power within the household in a
developing country. We implement the doubly robust matching estimator due to Lechner
et al. (2011), and the bias adjusted OLS estimator developed by Oster (2019) to address
selection on unobservables. Using data from Demographic and Health Survey 2011 survey,
we provide evidence on women’s say in household decisions in Bangladesh.
The evidence suggests that access to credit in the form of microcredit membership has
only limited impact on the decision making power of women in Bangladesh. In contrast,
having primary schooling or more education empowers women in participating in decisions
related to household expenditure, own and children’s health issues, and social interactions
27
(visiting friends and family). While the effects on health decisions may reflect comparative
advantage in knowledge intensive decisions, it is perhaps more striking that education also
enables women to participate in other decisions including visiting her natal family where the
conflict of preference between a woman and her husband can be especially sharp. Evidence
also suggests that the effects of education and access to credit are additively separable with
no significant interaction between them.
We explore the importance of three salient economic mechanisms widely noted in the
literature in mediating the impact of higher education: assortative matching in marriage,
working outside the home, and wealth effect. Evidence from Gelbach (2016) decomposition
suggests that working outside home is important as a mechanism, but we do not find any
significant role for marriage market matching or household wealth. Perhaps, more impor-
tant is the finding that the effects of education remain largely unchanged when we control
for indicators of these three mechanisms, suggesting that education enhances women’s say
primarily through the more intangible mechanisms, making her more confident, articulate,
and aware of her legal rights in a patrilineal society.
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Table 1: The marginal effects of access to credit (δ1), education (δ2), and joint treatment
(δ3) on women’s participation in household decision making.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variables Access to credit (δ1) Education (δ2) Joint-treatment (δ3)
OLS BC-RM OLS BC-RM OLS BC-RM
Visiting Family and Relatives 0.027* 0.015 0.057*** 0.046*** 0.069*** 0.051**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020)
Own Health Care 0.006 -0.003 0.085*** 0.071*** 0.063*** 0.050**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020)
Children’s Health Care 0.036*** 0.031** 0.049*** 0.042** 0.084*** 0.078***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019)
Large Household Purchase 0.04*** 0.022 0.056*** 0.046** 0.071*** 0.042**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
Combined indicators: Respondent participates in -
All 4 decisions 0.027** 0.013 0.055*** 0.046*** 0.049** 0.030
(0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020)
At least 3 of 4 0.034** 0.018 0.068*** 0.057*** 0.088*** 0.068***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020)
At least 2 of 4 0.027** 0.018 0.063*** 0.054*** 0.080*** 0.060***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019)
At least1 of 4 0.022* 0.016 0.060*** 0.049*** 0.072*** 0.061***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016)
Notes:
(1) Control variables include respondent’s age & age squared, religion (Islam), number of adult household members (10 years or
above), less than 0.50 acre of household land ownership; community characteristics - all weather access road, access to electricity,
post office, primary and high schools in the community, dummy variables for distance to the nearest city corporations; and district
fixed effect.
(2) Access to credit is defined as respondent being a member of income generating organizations such as Grameen Bank, BRAC,
Proshika, etc.
(3) Education is a dummy variable that takes on 1 if respondent has more than 5 years of schooling.
(4) BC-RM = Bias Corrected Radius Matching.
(5) Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
(6) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
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Table 2: The bias adjusted OLS (BA-OLS) estimates of the marginal effects of access to
credit (δ1), education (δ2), and joint treatment (δ3) on women’s participation in household
decision making.







z-score for δ3 = δ2
Visiting Family and Relatives 0.021 0.088*** 0.092*** 0.187
(0.014) (0.017) (0.020)
Own Health Care 0.001 0.112*** 0.084*** -1.036
(0.014) (0.018) (0.020)
Children’s Health Care 0.030** 0.078*** 0.106*** 1.128
(0.013) (0.017) (0.019)
Large Household Purchase 0.034** 0.087*** 0.092*** 0.180
(0.014) (0.019) (0.021)
Combined indicators: Respondent participates in -
All 4 decisions 0.021 0.083*** 0.071*** -0.432
(0.016) (0.018) (0.021)
At least 3 of 4 0.027* 0.101*** 0.113*** 0.495
(0.015) (0.016) (0.020)
At least 2 of 4 0.02 0.094*** 0.101*** 0.291
(0.014) (0.016) (0.019)
At least1 of 4 0.017 0.084*** 0.089*** 0.252
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
Notes:
(1) Control variables include respondent’s age & age squared, religion (Islam), number of adult household members (10 years or
above), less than 0.50 acre of household land ownership; community characteristics - all weather access road, access to electricity,
post office, primary and high schools in the community, dummy variables for distance to the nearest city corporations; and district
fixed effect.
(2) Access to credit is defined as respondent being a member of income generating organizations such as Grameen Bank, BRAC,
Proshika, etc.
(3) Education is a dummy variable that takes on 1 if respondent has more than 5 years of schooling.
(4) Bootstrapped standard errors from 250 replications are presented in parentheses.
(5) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
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Table 3: Test of complementarity between access to credit and education on women’s par-
ticipation in household decision making.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BC-RM BA-OLS














Visiting Family and Relatives 0.015 0.040** 1.060 0.021 0.028 0.273
(0.014) (0.020) (0.014) (0.019)
Own Health Care -0.003 -0.001 0.111 0.001 -0.014 -0.633
(0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.019)
Children’s Health Care 0.031** 0.063*** 1.370 0.030** 0.051*** 0.978
(0.014) (0.019) (0.013) (0.017)
Large Household Purchase 0.022 0.025 0.101 0.034** 0.019 -0.673
(0.014) (0.020) (0.014) (0.018)
Combined indicators: Respondent participates in -
All 4 decisions 0.013 0.020 0.296 0.021 0.006 -0.616
(0.015) (0.020) (0.016) (0.019)
At least 3 of 4 0.018 0.038* 0.821 0.027* 0.036* 0.355
(0.014) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020)
At least 2 of 4 0.018 0.040** 0.983 0.02 0.027 0.334
(0.013) (0.018) (0.014) (0.019)
At least 1 of 4 0.016 0.033** 0.887 0.017 0.018 0.021
(0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016)
Notes:
(1) Control variables include respondent’s age & age squared, religion (Islam), number of adult household members (10
years or above), less than 0.50 acre of household land ownership; community characteristics - all weather access road,
access to electricity, post office, primary and high schools in the community, dummy variables for distance to the nearest
city corporations; and district fixed effect.
(2) Access to credit is defined as respondent being a member of income generating organizations such as Grameen Bank,
BRAC, Proshika, etc.
(3) Education is a dummy variable that takes on 1 if respondent has more than 5 years of schooling.
(4) Clustered standard errors for BC-RM, and bootstrapped standard errors with 250 replications for BA-OLS estimates
are in parentheses.
(5) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 4: The bias adjusted OLS (BA-OLS) estimates of acess to credit, years of schooling
and the interaction effects.
(1) (2) (3)






Visiting Family and Relatives 0.037 0.019*** -0.010*
(0.025) (0.003) (0.006)
Own Health Care 0.012 0.020*** -0.008
(0.026) (0.003) (0.005)
Children’s Health Care 0.011 0.016*** -0.005
(0.027) (0.003) (0.006)
Large Household Purchase 0.027 0.015*** -0.009
(0.025) (0.003) (0.006)
Combined indicators: Respondent participates in -
All 4 decisions 0.02 0.016*** -0.006
(0.024) (0.003) (0.007)
At least 3 of 4 0.029 0.019*** -0.008
(0.026) (0.003) (0.006)
At least 2 of 4 0.011 0.018*** -0.007
(0.024) (0.003) (0.005)
At least1 of 4 0.028 0.017*** -0.010**
(0.018) (0.003) (0.005)
Notes:
(1) Control variables include respondent’s age & age squared, religion (Islam), number of adult
household members (10 years or above), less than 0.50 acre of household land ownership;
community characteristics - all weather access road, access to electricity, post office, primary and
high schools in the community, dummy variables for distance to the nearest city corporations; and
district fixed effect.
(2) Access to credit is defined as respondent being a member of income generating organizations
such as Grameen Bank, BRAC, Proshika, etc.
(3) Bootstrapped standard errors from 250 replications are presented in parentheses.
(4) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
35
Table 5: Relationship between education, and husband’s characteristics, women’s working status and household wealth index.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Variables Husband’s education
(6+)
Age gap with husband Husband wants more
children
Work outside Household wealth
index
OLS estimates with dummy variable for respondent having more than 5 years of schooling
Education (6+) 0.483*** 0.491*** -0.600*** -0.291* -0.020*** -0.007 0.013 0.035*** 0.573*** 0.553***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.114) (0.156) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.021) (0.022)
Access to Credit -0.015 -0.228* -0.001 0.052*** -0.050***
(0.010) (0.134) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013)
Education X Credit -0.099*** -0.274 -0.004 -0.003 -0.122***
(0.020) (0.223) (0.014) (0.015) (0.029)
OLS estimates with respondent’s years of schooling
Years of schooling 0.070*** 0.074*** -0.097*** -0.067*** -0.003*** -0.002 0.003** 0.007*** 0.085*** 0.086***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.015) (0.021) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Access to Credit -0.014 -0.171 0.001 0.057*** -0.032**
(0.011) (0.168) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015)
Schooling X Credit -0.007*** -0.040 -0.001 -0.001 -0.013***
(0.002) (0.029) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
BA-OLS (Oster 2019) estimates with dummy variable for respondent having more than 5 years of schooling
Education (6+) 5.005 -0.012 0.004 0.053*** 0.512***
(22.212) (0.178) (0.010) (0.012) (0.042)
Access to Credit 0.039*** -0.111 0 0.042*** 0.037**
(0.014) (0.151) (0.008) (0.010) (0.017)
Education X Credit -0.346*** 0.369 0.012 -0.056** -0.422***
(0.039) (0.281) (0.015) (0.023) (0.038)
BA-OLS (Oster 2019) estimates with respondent’s years of schooling
Years of Schooling 0.399 -0.034 -0.001 0.010*** 0.090***
(0.489) (0.026) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007)
Access to Credit 0.097*** 0.145 0.008 0.043** 0.165***
(0.026) (0.220) (0.012) (0.017) (0.033)
Schooling X Credit -0.051*** 0.110** 0.002 -0.014*** -0.066***
(0.007) (0.052) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Notes:
(1) The odd numbered columns do not include any control variables.
(2) The even numbered columns include the same control variables used in the main specification (including district fixed effects).
(3) Clustered standard errors for the OLS and bootstrapped standard errors with 250 replications for BA-OLS estimates are in
parentheses.
(4) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.
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Table 6: The marginal effects of education (δ2) with different specifications.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Husband
charateristics
Work outside Wealth Status All
BCRM BA-OLS BCRM BA-OLS BCRM BA-OLS BCRM BA-OLS
Visiting Family 0.053*** 0.091*** 0.043** 0.085*** 0.042** 0.094*** 0.047** 0.091***
and Relatives (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022)
Own Health Care 0.059*** 0.111*** 0.069*** 0.108*** 0.049*** 0.112*** 0.038* 0.106***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023)
Children’s Health Care 0.038* 0.083*** 0.04** 0.077*** 0.009 0.066*** 0.011 0.072***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021)
Large Household 0.059*** 0.12*** 0.041** 0.083*** 0.047** 0.104*** 0.054** 0.124***
Purchase (0.021) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.024)
Combined indicators: Respondent participates in
All 4 decisions 0.041** 0.117*** 0.042** 0.08*** 0.024 0.087*** 0.024 0.112***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024)
At least 3 of 4 0.055*** 0.107*** 0.052*** 0.097*** 0.039** 0.107*** 0.046** 0.107***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023)
At least 2 of 4 0.066*** 0.103*** 0.052*** 0.091*** 0.048*** 0.097*** 0.05** 0.101***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023)
At least 1 of 4 0.045*** 0.073*** 0.047*** 0.082*** 0.034** 0.08*** 0.027 0.069***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019)
Notes:
(1) In addition to the control variables in the main specification, columns(1) and(2) include husband’s education, age gap
with the respondent and the gap squared, and a dummy variable for husband wanting more children; columns (3) and (4)
include a dummy variable for the respondent working in the last twelve months; columns (5) and (6) include four wealth
status dummy variables for households at the top four quintles in the wealth index distribution; and columns (7) and(8)
include all of the additional control variables used in columns (1) to (6).
(2) Control group in each model is D00, that is, the group without access to credit and education.
(3) Clustered standard errors for BRCM and bootstrapped standard errors from 250 replications for BA-OLS are presented
in parentheses.
(4) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.
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Table 7: Gelbach decompositions of the education effects (in percentage points).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)








Participate in how many decisions
All 4 At least 3 At least 2 At least 1
Main specification 4.77*** 6.94*** 4.78*** 4.59*** 3.98*** 5.78*** 5.83*** 5.45***
(1.226) 1.204) (1.212) (1.254) (1.269) (1.287) (1.123) (0.965)
Main spec.+additional 4.06*** 5.83*** 3.44** 5.29*** 3.65*** 5.06*** 5.26*** 4.54***
control variables (1.426) 1.369) (1.364) (1.374) (1.341) (1.456) (1.313) (1.165)
Explained by the 0.71 1.11 1.33* -0.7 0.33 0.72 0.57 0.91
additional controls (0.713) 0.732) (0.685) (0.707) (0.741) (0.746) (0.657) (0.579)
Husband’s 0.59 0.93 0.21 -0.72 -0.33 0.27 0.33 0.77
characteristics (0.607) 0.628) (0.550) (0.608) (0.623) (0.588) (0.524) (0.536)
Work outside 0.18** 0.26*** 0.12* 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.20*** 0.12**
(0.076) 0.094) (0.063) (0.105) (0.110) (0.099) (0.073) (0.050)
Wealth status -0.07 -0.09 1.00** -0.28 0.38 0.17 0.04 0.02
(0.516) 0.588) (0.507) (0.558) (0.575) (0.583) (0.526) (0.448)
Notes:
(1) Estimates are converted to percentage points multiplying by 100.
(2) Covariates in the main specification: respondent’s age & age squared, religion (Islam), number of adult household members (10 years or above), less than 0.50 acre of
household land ownership; community characteristics - all weather access road, access to electricity, post office, primary and high schools in the community, dummy variables for
distance to the nearest city corporations; and district fixed effect.
(3) Husband’s characterisitics include a dummy for husband having more than primary schooling, age gap and the gap squared, and a dummy variable for husband wanting
more chindern than the respondent; working outside is dummy variable if respondent worked outside over the last 12 months; and wealth status is represented by 4 wealth
status dummy variables for households at the top four quitiles in household wealth index distribution
(4) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
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Figure 1: Standardized bias of covariates for BC-RM estiamtes.Treatment: Access to credit
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Table A.1: Distribution of the sample by treatment status.
Education = 0 Education = 1 Total































Table A.2: The mean participation rates by treatment status.
Participation D00 D10 D01 D11 All
indicators Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean
Visiting Family and
Relatives
3233 0.597 2110 0.578 2779 0.640 1242 0.609 9364 0.607
Own Health Care 3235 0.609 2113 0.630 2780 0.631 1244 0.623 9372 0.622
Children’s Health Care 3234 0.650 2110 0.626 2779 0.705 1244 0.682 9367 0.666
Large Household
Purchase
3236 0.564 2113 0.546 2780 0.623 1244 0.585 9373 0.581
Combined indicators: Respondent participates in -
all 4 decisions 3230 0.398 2107 0.384 2778 0.443 1242 0.394 9357 0.408
at least 3 of 4 3230 0.551 2107 0.537 2778 0.604 1242 0.577 9357 0.567
at least 2 of 4 3230 0.678 2107 0.666 2778 0.725 1242 0.707 9357 0.693
at least 1 of 4 3230 0.792 2107 0.792 2778 0.828 1242 0.823 9357 0.807
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Access to credit &
education
%bias t-stat %bias t-stat %bias t-stat
Age Unmatched 1.3 0.5 -77.3 0 -77.2 0
Matched -0.7 -0.25 0.4 0.13 1.5 0.41
Age squared Unmatched 0 -0.01 -76.6 0 -76.6 0
Matched -0.9 -0.35 -0.6 -0.22 0.9 0.27
Muslim Unmatched -12 -4.68 -8.1 0.003 -28.4 0
Matched -2.6 -0.93 -2.6 -0.81 -1.4 -0.31
Household size (10 years or
older)
Unmatched -3.4 -1.31 7 0.011 -2.8 0.397
Matched 2.8 1.09 1.3 0.4 5.6 1.39
Less than 0.5 acres of land Unmatched 29.3 11.17 -37.5 0 -5.7 0.086
Matched -2.8 -1.33 -0.3 -0.08 -2.5 -0.6
Community has access road Unmatched 9.7 3.76 14.5 0 23 0
Matched 1.4 0.51 -4.3 -1.43 0.4 0.11
Community has electricity Unmatched 8.1 3.13 21.9 0 25.6 0
Matched 4 1.48 -2.7 -0.97 -3.4 -0.95
Community has post office Unmatched 4.2 1.61 7 0.012 10.2 0.002
Matched 5 1.88 -1.7 -0.53 -3.2 -0.76
Community has primary
school
Unmatched -3.4 -1.31 2.8 0.311 2.9 0.395
Matched 2.4 0.86 1.2 0.38 1.3 0.32
Community has high school Unmatched 7.5 2.9 9.3 0.001 15.1 0
Matched 0.5 0.17 0.3 0.11 -3.5 -0.86
Distance to the city
corporation: Within 10 to
20 km
Unmatched -7.1 -2.74 -0.6 0.843 2.6 0.434
Matched -1 -0.41 0.6 0.21 -8.9 -2.04
Within 20 to 30 km Unmatched -8 -3.08 1.5 0.592 -2.9 0.389
Matched 2.3 0.93 1.1 0.36 -3.5 -0.88
Within 30 to 40 km Unmatched 4.1 1.59 11 0 8.5 0.009
Matched -1.1 -0.4 -0.9 -0.28 2 0.48
Within 40 to 60 km Unmatched -3.1 -1.2 11 0 -1.4 0.675
Matched 1.8 0.68 0.8 0.25 0 0.01
Within 60 to 100 km Unmatched 12 4.63 -12.4 0 1.2 0.715
Matched -3.3 -1.2 -1.6 -0.53 6 1.51
More than 100 km Unmatched -7.8 -3.01 -19 0 -13 0
Matched 2.7 1.12 -0.1 -0.04 -1.7 -0.47
Notes:






× 100, where XT and S
2
T
are the mean and variance of covariate X for treatment
group, and XC and S
2
C
are the mean and variance of X for the control group, respectively.
‘
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Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics.
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Outcome variables
Visiting Family and Relatives 9364 0.607 0.488 0 1
Own Health Care 9372 0.622 0.485 0 1
Children’s Health Care 9367 0.666 0.472 0 1
Large Household Purchase 9373 0.581 0.493 0 1
Participate in all 4 decisions 9357 0.408 0.491 0 1
Particiaptes in at least 3 decisions out of 4 9357 0.567 0.495 0 1
Participate in at least 2 of 4 decisions 9357 0.693 0.461 0 1
Participate in at least 1 of 4 decisions 9357 0.807 0.395 0 1
Treatment variables
Access to Credit 9373 0.43 0.495 0 1
Education (more than 5 years of schooling) 9373 0.351 0.477 0 1
(Access to Credit)x(Education) 9373 0.129 0.335 0 1
Control variables
Age 9373 30.802 8.974 15 49
Age gap with husband 9373 8.992 4.722 0 25
Worked in last 12 months 9373 0.11 0.313 0 1
Husband wants more children 9373 0.094 0.291 0 1
Husband has more than 5 years of schooling 9373 0.346 .476 0 1
Muslim 9373 0.898 0.303 0 1
1=Land owned less than 0.5 acres 9373 0.826 0.379 0 1
Number of household members (10 years or
above)
9373 4.023 1.862 1 20
All weather access road 9373 0.631 0.483 0 1
Access to electricity 9373 0.778 0.416 0 1
Community has primary school 9373 0.821 0.384 0 1
Community has high school 9373 0.355 0.479 0 1
Community has post office 9373 0.247 0.431 0 1
Distance to the city corporation: Within 10 km 9373 0.009 0.096 0 1
Within 10 to 20 km 9373 0.076 0.265 0 1
Within 20 to 30 km 9373 0.078 0.268 0 1
Within 30 to 40 km 9373 0.129 0.336 0 1
Within 40 to 60 km 9373 0.253 0.435 0 1
Within 60 to 100 km 9373 0.388 0.487 0 1
More than 100 km 9373 0.066 0.249 0 1
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Table A.5: Covariate balance test statistics for BC-RM estimator.
Treatment Sample Pseudo R2 LRχ2 p > χ2 Mean Bias
Credit=1, Education=0 Unmatched 0.029 242.74 0.000 7.6
(vs Credit=0, Education=0) Matched 0.002 15.30 0.503 2.2
Credit=0, Education=1 Unmatched 0.164 1174.57 0 19.8
(vs Credit=0, Education=0) Matched 0.002 10.91 0.815 1.3
Credit=1, Education=1 Unmatched 0.138 728.56 0 18.6
(vs Credit=0, Education=0) Matched 0.004 45.63 0.654 2.9
Note: Null hypothesis - covariates are balanced.
Figure A.1: Propensity score distribution by treatment status for BC-RM estimator.
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Table A.6: BA-OLS estimates of the marginal effects of access to credit, δ1 .











All 4 decisions At least3 At least 2 At least 1
0 0.027 0.006 0.036 0.040 0.027 0.034 0.027 0.022
0.2 0.026 0.005 0.035 0.039 0.026 0.032 0.025 0.021
0.4 0.025 0.004 0.034 0.038 0.025 0.031 0.024 0.020
0.6 0.023 0.003 0.032 0.036 0.024 0.030 0.022 0.019
0.8 0.022 0.002 0.031 0.035 0.022 0.029 0.021 0.018
1.0 0.021 0.001 0.030 0.034 0.021 0.027 0.020 0.017
1.2 0.020 0.000 0.028 0.032 0.020 0.026 0.018 0.016
1.4 0.019 -0.002 0.027 0.031 0.019 0.024 0.017 0.015
1.6 0.018 -0.003 0.026 0.030 0.017 0.023 0.015 0.014
1.8 0.016 -0.004 0.024 0.028 0.016 0.022 0.014 0.013
2.0 0.015 -0.005 0.023 0.027 0.015 0.020 0.012 0.012
Notes:
(1) µ represents the level of selection on unobservables relative to observables.
(2) First row represents OLS estimates.




(4) Control variables include respondent’s age & age squared, religion (Islam), number of adult household members (10 years or above),
less than 0.50 acre of household land ownership; community characteristics - all weather access road, access to electricity, post office,
primary and high schools in the community, dummy variables for distance to the nearest city corporations; and district fixed effect.
(5) Control group in each model is D00, that is, the group without access to credit and education.
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Table A.7: BA-OLS estimates of the marginal effects of education, δ2.













All 4 decisions At least 3 At least 2 At least 1
0 0.057 0.085 0.049 0.056 0.055 0.068 0.063 0.060
0.2 0.063 0.090 0.054 0.062 0.060 0.074 0.069 0.065
0.4 0.069 0.095 0.060 0.068 0.066 0.080 0.075 0.069
0.6 0.075 0.100 0.066 0.074 0.071 0.087 0.081 0.074
0.8 0.081 0.106 0.072 0.080 0.077 0.094 0.087 0.079
1.0 0.088 0.112 0.078 0.087 0.083 0.101 0.094 0.084
1.2 0.094 0.117 0.085 0.093 0.090 0.108 0.100 0.089
1.4 0.102 0.124 0.092 0.101 0.096 0.116 0.108 0.095
1.6 0.109 0.130 0.100 0.108 0.103 0.124 0.115 0.101
1.8 0.118 0.138 0.108 0.116 0.111 0.133 0.124 0.108
2.0 0.127 0.145 0.117 0.126 0.119 0.143 0.133 0.115
Notes:
(1) µ represents the level of selection on unobservables relative to observables.
(2) First row represents OLS estimates.




(4) Control variables include respondent’s age & age squared, religion (Islam), number of adult household members (10 years or
above), less than 0.50 acre of household land ownership; community characteristics - all weather access road, access to electricity,
post office, primary and high schools in the community, dummy variables for distance to the nearest city corporations; and
district fixed effect.
(5) Control group in each model is D00, that is, the group without access to credit and education.
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Table A.8: BA-OLS estimates of the marginal effects of “access to credit and education” on women’s participation in household
decision making, δ3.













All 4 decisions At least 3 At least 2 At least 1
0 0.069 0.063 0.084 0.071 0.049 0.088 0.080 0.072
0.2 0.074 0.067 0.089 0.075 0.053 0.093 0.084 0.075
0.4 0.078 0.071 0.093 0.079 0.058 0.098 0.088 0.078
0.6 0.083 0.075 0.097 0.083 0.062 0.103 0.092 0.082
0.8 0.087 0.079 0.102 0.087 0.067 0.108 0.096 0.085
1.0 0.092 0.084 0.106 0.092 0.071 0.113 0.101 0.089
1.2 0.098 0.088 0.111 0.096 0.076 0.119 0.105 0.093
1.4 0.103 0.093 0.117 0.101 0.082 0.125 0.110 0.097
1.6 0.109 0.098 0.122 0.106 0.087 0.131 0.116 0.101
1.8 0.115 0.103 0.128 0.112 0.093 0.138 0.121 0.106
2.0 0.121 0.109 0.134 0.118 0.099 0.145 0.127 0.111
Notes:
(1) µ represents the level of selection on unobservables relative to observables.
(2) First row represents OLS estimates.




(4) Control variables include respondent’s age & age squared, religion (Islam), number of adult household members (10 years or
above), less than 0.50 acre of household land ownership; community characteristics - all weather access road, access to electricity,
post office, primary and high schools in the community, dummy variables for distance to the nearest city corporations; and
district fixed effect.
(5) Control group in each model is D00, that is, the group without access to credit and education.
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Table A.9: BA-OLS estimates of [δ3 − (δ1 + δ2)].













All 4 decisions At least 3 At least 2 At least 1
0 -0.009 -0.023 0.007 -0.018 -0.027 -0.008 -0.001 -0.004
0.2 -0.010 -0.026 0.005 -0.021 -0.029 -0.010 -0.003 -0.007
0.4 -0.012 -0.030 0.003 -0.025 -0.031 -0.013 -0.006 -0.010
0.6 -0.014 -0.034 0.001 -0.029 -0.033 -0.017 -0.009 -0.014
0.8 -0.017 -0.039 -0.001 -0.034 -0.035 -0.021 -0.013 -0.019
1.0 -0.020 -0.045 -0.004 -0.041 -0.038 -0.026 -0.017 -0.025
1.2 -0.023 -0.053 -0.008 -0.048 -0.042 -0.032 -0.022 -0.032
1.4 -0.028 -0.063 -0.013 -0.058 -0.047 -0.040 -0.029 -0.041
1.6 -0.034 -0.075 -0.019 -0.070 -0.053 -0.050 -0.038 -0.053
1.8 -0.042 -0.093 -0.027 -0.088 -0.061 -0.063 -0.050 -0.070
2.0 -0.054 -0.124 -0.039 -0.117 -0.073 -0.084 -0.069 -0.103
Notes:
(1) µ represents the level of selection on unobservables relative to observables.
(2) First row represents OLS estimates.




(4) Control variables include respondent’s age & age squared, religion (Islam), number of adult household members (10 years or
above), less than 0.50 acre of household land ownership; community characteristics - all weather access road, access to electricity,
post office, primary and high schools in the community, dummy variables for distance to the nearest city corporations; and
district fixed effect.
(5) Control group in each model is D00, that is, the group without access to credit and education.
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